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MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

**A BRIGHTER FUTURE FOR THE DARK CONTINENT:
THE UNITED STATES MILITARY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA**

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Featured during the recent G-8 Summit in Scotland, Sub-Saharan Africa is attracting renewed attention at the highest levels of the U.S. government. As United States Africa policy becomes inextricably tied to U.S. energy security and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), it becomes increasingly important to assess the U.S. military's posture in relation to American interests. One particular African sub-region that has only recently begun to capture U.S. attention is the Gulf of Guinea. In order to better protect its rapidly expanding strategic interests in the Gulf of Guinea, the United States needs to consider significant changes to its military posture in west/central Africa.

Defining the Battlespace

The Gulf of Guinea includes portions of three of the five sub-regions of the African Union (AU), extending along the western coast of Africa from Ghana in the northwest to Angola in the south, and including the West African nations of Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria, the Central African nations of Sao Thome and Principe, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), and Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), and the Southern African nation of Angola. Nigeria, specifically, has been defined as one of four regional 'anchor states' of U.S. national security strategy in Africa.¹



Why does the Gulf of Guinea matter?

The Gulf of Guinea is a strategically important supplier of oil to the U.S. and has large, untapped reserves of oil and natural gas. Five of the top fifteen countries that supply US crude oil are from Africa, and four of these are from the Gulf of Guinea (Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea).² Rising global demand for oil, particularly in aspiring superpowers like India and China, combined with instability in the Middle East (resulting in a desire to diversify sources of supply), and the presence of extensive deepwater oil reserves in the Gulf of Guinea have all contributed to greater demand for oil from Africa: “The United States, in diversifying its sources of oil, can be expected to increase its reliance on Gulf of Guinea oil from the current level of 15 percent to 25 percent of U.S. oil imports by 2015.”³ Diversity of sources of supply clearly increases United States energy security, and West African oil is much closer to American refineries than Persian Gulf oil. In fact, “West African oil is regarded as one of the few major alternatives to the Middle East for future oil production.”⁴

Qualitatively, most African crude oil is lighter and has lower sulfur content than Persian Gulf oil, qualities that increase gasoline yield and create less air pollution. Africa is also one of the few promising oil regions where companies can take ownership in reserves they discover.⁵ Shell, ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco are among the many corporate giants that have invested billions of dollars and employ thousands of Americans in the Gulf of Guinea region.

U.S. interest in the region is also linked to the broader principles and national values referred to in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, in which President George W. Bush vowed to “actively work to bring the hope of

democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”⁶

The promotion of these values is fundamental to the United States’ vision of global stability and political/economic opportunity as essential components of U.S. national security. The promotion of these values is critical to the United States’ ability to maintain credibility as well as a leadership role in the international community.

Threats

Capt Luann Grier recently noted in the Marine Corps Gazette that at the Berlin Conference in 1885, “European powers divided Africa into 50 colonies. Artificial boundaries were drawn over approximately 1,000 indigenous cultures... without regard to language or ethnic groups.... [M]odern African nations are still suffering from these random divisions.”⁷ Post-colonial nations within Africa have struggled to develop a cohesive national identity. Tribal identification and competition for influence and resources have fostered conflict and inhibited the formation of national allegiance. Civil wars have resulted in unimaginable brutality and even genocide within nations such as the Congo where approximately 4 million people have died since 1996.⁸

Ungoverned spaces, areas within national borders that are characterized by an inability of the nation to exercise effective state sovereignty, facilitate the presence and financing of terrorist networks within the Gulf of Guinea. One of the most dangerous areas in Sub-Saharan Africa is the Niger Delta region. “Billions of dollars worth of oil that comes out of the Niger delta is loaded on supertankers in the Gulf of Guinea and taken up and sold on the stock market in Amsterdam. Somewhere between two and four billion dollars of oil is lost in a year in that transaction and the people that are making that money don’t want law and order in the Gulf of Guinea; they want it just like it is.”⁹ A

portion of this money almost certainly moves from criminal organizations into the coffers of terrorist networks.

And, while a significant portion of U.S. oil interests and almost all new production facilities are being developed offshore with advanced deep water drilling technology, “a glaring vulnerability in the Gulf of Guinea is the lack of effective control over its maritime and coastal environment. This has encouraged levels of piracy unrivaled in Africa (and in global terms, second only to the Malacca Straits in Southeast Asia). It invites... terror attacks against an energy infrastructure that was constructed with no serious sabotage threat in mind.”¹⁰ The naval forces of Gulf of Guinea nations simply do not have the capability to protect the offshore oil infrastructure. Considering the instability in the Middle East and increasing worldwide demand for oil, any disruption in the supply of oil from the Gulf of Guinea could have significant implications for the global market.

Many other problems are epic to an extent that most Americans cannot comprehend. The population of Sub-Saharan Africa has nearly doubled since 1980 to more than 750 million and is expected to exceed 1 billion by 2019.¹¹ The average life expectancy is only 46 years,¹² and 71% of the African population is under the age of 25,¹³ with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of only \$600 in 2004. As of 2003, among other pandemics, 7% of the adult population (ages 15-49) of Sub-Saharan Africa was infected with HIV,¹⁴ and 2.3 million people died from AIDS.¹⁵ The population has tremendous potential to enable productivity and growth, but severe population pressures and a lack of economic opportunity unfortunately create an even greater potential for instability posing a direct threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf of Guinea.

International Influence

Although several European countries maintain ties to Sub-Saharan Africa, the most significant former colonial powers in Africa today are the French and the British. The French in particular maintain permanent military bases in Djibouti, Chad, Cote D'Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal, while other French units serve elsewhere with multi-national forces. "Militarily, the French armed forces see that the problems are way larger than they can deal with and there's plenty of room for all of us."¹⁶ A French Colonel is currently on the staff of the National Defense University's Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) full time, and one of his predecessors on the ACSS staff now guides Africa policy on the French joint staff. Retired Marine LtGen Carlton Fulford, Dean of ACSS, believes that politically, however, "France sees [Gulf of Guinea] as their backyard and don't want us involved any more than we have to."¹⁷ Organizations such as the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie help to maintain the influence that France still enjoys on the Continent, while Total, Elf, British Petroleum, and other European oil giants are deeply invested in the Gulf of Guinea.

Among U.S. near-peer competitors in Africa, China has been aggressively and successfully expanding its interests in the Gulf of Guinea region for many years. Grier notes that "China's trade with Africa has nearly tripled since 2000.... In 2004 China imported nearly one-third of its crude oil needs from Africa."¹⁸ China currently contributes forces to several U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa, thus enhancing Chinese legitimacy and reinforcing their commitment to the Continent, while thousands of Chinese 'workers' are actively engaged in both developing and protecting Chinese contracts in Africa.

Chinese influence in Africa should not be viewed as an immediate threat to the United States. Development of African oil production capacity is generally positive regardless of who secures the contracts as this development increases the amount of light, sweet crude available on the global market, thus keeping prices stable. It will be decades before the Chinese will be able to challenge U.S. global naval supremacy and the sea lanes required to transport oil from the African continent to China are long and subject to interdiction at many points, such as the Strait of Malacca. Ultimately, peace and stability are conditions that best support our mutual interests in the Gulf of Guinea, and should provide the basis for cooperation.

Current Situation

As United States and international investment in the Gulf of Guinea expands, it is increasingly likely that the U.S. will be actively drawn into engagement on the Continent. The United States has a long history of deploying expeditionary forces to Africa to protect American citizens and American interests. “During the past decade many armed humanitarian intervention and contingency operations have taken place in Africa. Marines have been engaged in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Djibouti. It is reasonable to predict they will be called upon again to respond in a crisis.”¹⁹

Conversely, America’s historical inaction in places like Rwanda severely damaged United States credibility in Africa and in the larger international community. “[T]he likelihood that internal violence and humanitarian disasters will prompt more calls for U.S. intervention will likely be enduring concerns for America in the future.”²⁰ The painful memory of past American failures to intervene decisively to prevent genocide and alleviate large-scale human suffering, combined with our recent experience with

enormous natural disasters at home, makes it increasingly likely that United States policymakers will feel morally compelled to act in future situations requiring conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.

The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) is the combatant command primarily responsible for American strategic interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. In West Africa, EUCOM is engaged in the Department of State's (DOS) Trans-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). TSCTI, which includes nine countries in Western Africa, builds on the earlier and more limited Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and is focused on three large ungoverned border regions within the Sahel region.²¹ As an interagency initiative, TSCTI combines USAID programs to address socio-economic and health problems with foreign internal defense (FID) training that enhances the capability of partner nations to combat terrorism.

TSCTI is directly linked to the Gulf of Guinea through the TSCTI partner nation of Nigeria. The Niger Delta serves as a transit area for terrorists moving from the Gulf of Guinea into northern Nigeria and the Sahel region. As the United States succeeds in denying terrorists sanctuary in the ungoverned spaces of the Sahel, it is probable that terrorists will try to expand their influence elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea. For this reason, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) future planners are studying the Gulf of Guinea (SOCEUR runs the EUCOM component of TSCTI known as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahel (OEF-TS)).

In addition to the TSCTI, DOS invests millions of dollars annually through the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) paying foreign military leaders and some civilians to attend schools in the U.S.²² DOS's 5-year, \$200 million²³

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) places its primary emphasis on Africa, running through a subordinate program called the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program (ACOTA).²⁴ Focusing on infantry skills, human rights, humanitarian operations, and rules of engagement consistent with Chapter 7 of the UN charter, ACOTA currently trains 3 to 4 battalions a year.²⁵ Within the Gulf of Guinea, Ghana and Benin have remained a focus of ACOTA training, which seeks to complement and support EU, French, British, Belgian, and other allied peacekeeping training efforts and welcomes their participation.²⁶

The permanent U.S. military presence in the Gulf of Guinea, however, is small. American embassies and consulates have their associated Marine Security Guard detachments and small numbers of personnel associated with the defense attaché offices. There is an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) at the U.S. embassy in Nigeria. But “with billions of US investment, thousands of US workers on the ground, and strategic supplies of energy at stake, [i]t is very much in U.S. interests to become more directly engaged in strengthening the Gulf’s maritime security.”²⁷ This essentially is the focus of EUCOM’s nascent regional campaign plan (RCP) for the Gulf of Guinea.

J. Stephen Morrison and David L. Goldwyn of the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently noted that “in the past two years, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) has drawn considerable U.S. attention to the Gulf of Guinea. EUCOM’s assertions have stirred a valuable and constructive debate in Washington on the nature of regional threats and how best to address them.”²⁸ Part of a broader, interagency effort aimed at improving the underlying conditions that cause instability in Gulf of Guinea nations, EUCOM’s RCP is a 10-year plan to promote stability by

improving the professionalism of regional military forces. Developed by NAVFAC, the focus is on enhancing maritime security through theater security cooperation training and a high-level dialogue that fosters regional cooperation.

If the United States is required to respond unilaterally to a crisis, however, with the exception of the limited response capability inherent in Marine Expeditionary Units, the U.S. currently relies on bilateral agreements for the use of host nation facilities in the Gulf of Guinea to ensure access to the region. These agreements, known as Cooperative Security Locations (CSL), currently exist in Ghana, Gabon, Angola, and Sao Tome and Principe (STP). CSL's, however, still equate largely to a reliance on regional state access and infrastructure to facilitate the response of U.S. forces in the event we must intervene unilaterally or in support of other regional or international forces.²⁹ Without any permanent, or even regular, U.S. military presence in the Gulf of Guinea (U.S. currently has no plans to develop a Forward Operating Site [FOS] or Main Operating Base [MOB]), bi-lateral agreements provide an insufficient guarantee of timely response and actual capability in the event of a crisis. We may be poorly positioned to respond quickly and decisively to large-scale crises or to protect U.S. interests in the Gulf of Guinea.

Improving our Military Posture

Enhancing the security of American interests in the Gulf of Guinea necessarily involves a dual approach: improving the posture of United States forces and improving regional capabilities. Programs like IMET and ACOTA are as important for the relationships they foster as they are for the capabilities they build. These programs should be expanded and made a priority for U.S. military support, but these programs alone do not provide a guarantor of American interests in the region. To enhance the

capability of the United States to act quickly in the event of a crisis, we should increase our naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea. Without guaranteed access or continental based forces, the United States will continue to rely on naval forces as the only forces that can project power quickly without reliance on African nations for support.

Currently, the West Africa Training Cruise conducts bi-lateral annual engagement as part of EUCOM's strategy for Theater Security Cooperation. EUCOM could expand this by coordinating a continuous coalition naval presence in the region and making the Gulf of Guinea a focus area for Marine Expeditionary Unit deployments. The regular engagement of naval forces in the Gulf of Guinea would not only achieve tangible steps toward relationship and capacity building, it would send a clear signal of American commitment to protect U.S. interests and to support partner nations in the region.

The U.S. could also move Maritime Prepositioned Squadron (MPSRON) 1 from its' current location in the Mediterranean to a base in the Gulf of Guinea. MPSRON's have never been viewed by the Marine Corps or by the Department of Defense as floating warehouses, but rather as capabilities; they are an integral part of American capability to deploy and employ MAGTF's worldwide on short notice. MPSRON locations should therefore be determined based on where MAGTF's will most likely be employed and where they can best facilitate reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) into the theater. Moving an MPSRON has strategic implications, but with Europe taking an increasingly regional approach to European problems, it is more probable that the United States will commit a MAGTF to western Africa than to Europe.

Along these lines, any plan to move an MPSRON to Africa's western coast should involve an assessment of probable missions. The heavy ground combat power

orientation of this MPSRON's equipment load should be modified to facilitate humanitarian relief/disaster assistance/peace operations, and include a more limited offensive capability for historically likely missions such as NEO and emerging missions such as FID. It might be appropriate, for instance, to replace some of the M1A1's with more trucks for transport and heavy lift, and increase the percentage of engineering equipment, medical supplies, etc. Married up with the hospital ship USNS Comfort from Baltimore, a regionally located MPSRON would provide a timely and robust capability for crisis response in support of an American or regional/international force.

The potential is significant for MPSRON equipment to enable regional or coalition military forces to act decisively when the U.S. desires to lead international efforts but prefers to minimize the number of U.S. boots on the ground. The MPSRON's equipment could substantially enhance the capability of other forces in support of U.S. global interests. Or the U.S. could achieve this capacity by pre-positioning supplies ashore in the Gulf of Guinea. The Marine assets in the Norway Air Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade (NALMEB) pre-positioned supplies have recently been used to augment American forces in the Middle East. An African counterpart could enable regional or coalition forces, augment a MEU's organic assets, or equip the fly-in echelon of an Air Contingency MAGTF from the United States. Supplies could then be moved relatively short distances by air or by sea to the required location.

Enhancing Regional Capacity

Although the United States must enhance its capability to unilaterally protect American interests in the Gulf of Guinea, a focus of U.S. military efforts could be to strengthen African military forces and enhance the effectiveness of regional

organizations. Several existing African organizations currently provide a forum for cooperation and common interest in the region. The five brigades of the African Union's nascent African Standby Force (ASF)³⁰ will range from 2700 to 6700 troops apiece and all are expected to be operational by July 2010,³¹ although the first operational deployment of ASF forces is currently ongoing in Sudan's Darfur region.³² EUCOM and CENTCOM could seek to focus regional training with the ASF. Participation in the development of these forces, through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in the Gulf of Guinea sub-region, provides a tremendous opportunity for the United States to develop regional capabilities and build relationships that will facilitate future regional access and further enhance U.S. influence in the Gulf of Guinea.

Of the many existing sub-regional organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, none focus exclusively on the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea Commission, a regional organization proposed by Nigerian President Obasanjo in 1999 and focused on maritime security, has failed in ratification efforts of its treaty due to boundary disputes between members, while ECOWAS,³³ one of the most influential sub-regional organizations, does not include Gabon or Angola. And although there are organizations dedicated exclusively to Gulf of Guinea maritime issues, maritime security is a specific problem that transcends all of them.³⁴

To complement these organizations, the United States could build a regional naval training center in the Gulf of Guinea. Consistent with EUCOM's RCP, this center could focus on the development of professionalism, capability, standardization, and safety within partner nation naval / coast guard forces. The center could also include a riverine

training component; the problems endemic to the Niger Delta alone provide adequate justification for this. Focusing on leadership development, the center would provide a forum for the development of regional cooperation within the Gulf of Guinea. African instructors and staff should eventually replace the initial U.S. and European staff until the center eventually falls entirely under regional ownership and responsibility. A deliberate plan for this eventual transition would ease suspicions of ulterior U.S. motives in its development. Although the United States would bear a significant portion of the initial costs of building such a center, the long-term return on investment would be substantial.

There are several possible locations for a naval training center or for positioning a future MPSRON. Sao Thome and Principe (STP) “would be an ideal location for a training facility or a forward base... and fortunately the Voice of America has a huge compound there already that could be leveraged.”³⁵ STP, as an island nation, offers great potential in this regard and with time and significant investment might eventually host a deep-water port and an airfield that could support an MPSRON. With large, untapped oil reserves, facilities in STP will eventually be developed and it might as well be in conjunction with the U.S. in this strategically vital part of the world. Cape Verde, another island nation off the coast of western Africa is more removed from the Gulf of Guinea than STP, but also more developed and politically stable. Perhaps in 20 years one of the two might be the Atlantic Ocean version of Guam or Diego Garcia. The French currently have a detachment based in Gabon and fly C-160 aircraft (similar to C-130) out of there. The United States already has a CSL agreement with Gabon and has previously built warehouses at the end of the runway using exercise construction funds, so there is a

U.S. footprint already on the ground. Accra, Ghana, one of America's ACOTA partner nations and home of the IMO, is another possibility, as is Equatorial Guinea or Angola.

Making it an Interagency Effort

Ultimately, regional security can only be substantively realized through a more comprehensive U.S. policy that addresses other fundamental causes of instability, such as corruption, poverty, crime, education and health care. "EUCOM's convening power, and its ability to deploy ships and organize training missions can be a key tool in any effective Gulf of Guinea political strategy.... Up to now, however, EUCOM has not yet been able to enlist the support of key Washington departments and agencies to support the initiative."³⁶ The lack of a central 'forcing function' or policy coordination agency significantly hampers EUCOM's ability to achieve regional goals.

James Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner of The Heritage Foundation have argued that the fact that the United States does not have a separate regional command for Sub-Saharan Africa "is a vestige of both the continent's colonial legacy and the Cold War."³⁷ It is difficult to do justice to the complexity of the challenges that America faces in the region when Sub-Saharan Africa takes its place on a long list of geographically and culturally distinct areas that the United States European Command (EUCOM) must address. Compelling arguments have been made for the establishment of a sub-unified command or for an entirely separate and distinct geographic combatant command (GCC) for Sub-Saharan Africa (AFCOM).³⁸ Still others have argued that a coherent national strategy/policy toward the region requires some sort of empowered 'regional coordinator' to implement that strategy. The establishment of such a position is not unprecedented³⁹

and would go a long way towards enabling the synchronization of efforts among U.S. governmental agencies.⁴⁰

In lieu of a fundamental change to the Unified Command Plan, EUCOM could follow the model of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA) and establish a CJTF Gulf of Guinea headquarters under the command of NAVFAC. Although a future CJTF Gulf of Guinea, like CJTF HOA, might only have moral authority over other government agencies, it would serve as a regionally located focal point for the coordination of EUCOM's military initiatives in the region with DOS programs such as GPOI and IMET. The headquarters would also actively engage the interagency and the Gulf of Guinea country teams to ensure cooperation, or at least coordination of effort. Through the CJTF headquarters, liaison officers should be embedded from and with the AU and the relevant sub-regional organizations. Members of Gulf of Guinea partner nations, not just former European colonial powers, should be included on the staff to make the organization a combined headquarters with a clearly regional identity. Even lacking authority, the CJTF's focus, accessibility and active engagement would be constructive.

Conclusion

“Extraordinary changes are propelling [Africa] toward a destiny its presidents cannot comprehend or control. Where these changes take Africa will influence, and perhaps determine, the world’s direction in the twenty-first century....”⁴¹ The military is but one of the elements of national power that needs to be leveraged to protect the rapidly expanding American interests in the Gulf of Guinea. The United States, however, should not underestimate the value of actual presence as a guarantor of American security and as

an indicator of American commitment to the region. Greater investment in the development of regional forces should be complemented by the commitment of more responsive U.S. naval forces and a more focused command structure to protect United States interests in the Gulf of Guinea.

¹ George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 11. The others 3 anchor states are Kenya, South Africa and Ethiopia.

² United States Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, "Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports: Top Fifteen Countries," Aug 2005. URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html>. Accessed 29 November 2005.

³ J. Stephen Morrison and David L. Goldwyn, "A Strategic U.S. Approach to Governance and Security in the Gulf of Guinea," Center for Strategic and International Studies , 1 July 2005, 5. URL: <http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=1891>

⁴ Jim Landers, "African Oil Fields: Rewards and Risks," The Dallas Morning News, 6 Oct 2004. URL: <<http://www.energybulletin.net/2416.html>>. Accessed: 30 September 2005.

⁵ Landers.

⁶ Bush, Introduction.

⁷ CAPT Luann Grier, USNR (Ret), "Africa: Tomorrow's Strategic Challenge," Marine Corps Gazette, September 2005, 58.

⁸ Elena Kim-Mitchell, Director, Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, presentation to National Defense University conference, Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), 16 November 2005.

⁹ General Carlton Fulford, USMC (Ret), Dean, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, interview by Major Benjamin Watson, 3 Nov 2005.

¹⁰ J. Stephen Morrison, Director, CSIS Africa Program, testimony before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, The Gulf of Guinea and US Strategic Energy Policy, 15 July 2004.

¹¹ United Nations, Population Division, "World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision," Population Database, 2005. URL: <<http://esa.un.org/unpp/>>. Accessed 15 November 2005.

¹² World Bank, "World Development Indicators 2005." URL: <<http://www.worldbank.org/data>>. Accessed: 15 November 2005.

¹³ Charles E. Cobb, Jr., "Africa in Fact," National Geographic, September 2005.

¹⁴ World Bank, "World Development Indicators 2005."

¹⁵ Grier, 60.

¹⁶ Fulford.

¹⁷ Fulford.

¹⁸ Grier, 60.

¹⁹ Grier, 60.

²⁰ James Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner, "U.S. Military Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution," Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, no. 1697 (Oct 15, 2003). URL: <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Africa/bg1697.cfm>>

²¹ The most-noteworthy success of the PSI was in March 2004 when US trained Chadian forces interdicted and killed 43 and captured 18 terrorist members of the Al Quaida-linked Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).

²² U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005, (Washington, D.C.: April 2005). Legislative restrictions have resulted in the suspension of IMET funding in Benin because of Benin's failure to sign an Article 98 Agreement exempting Americans from prosecution by the International Criminal Court. IMET has been suspended in Nigeria for human rights abuses. Chapter 5 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended, authorizes the IMET program to provide military education and training to foreign military and civilian personnel. According to Section 541 of the FAA, IMET-funded training is intended: To encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security; to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries; and to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.

²³ Kim-Mitchell.

²⁴ Initiated in 1997 as the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), the program was renamed ACOTA in 2002.

²⁵ COL Jeff Wheeler, “Strategy for Africa... helping Africans help themselves” (Presentation, Directorate of Strategy, Policy, and Assessments, United States European Command, 10 March 2005).

²⁶ U.S. Department of State, “Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program” (Presentation, February 2004).

²⁷ David L. Goldwyn, testimony before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, The Gulf of Guinea and US Strategic Energy Policy, 15 July 2004.

²⁸ Morrison and Goldwyn, vii.

²⁹ Al Cornella et al., “Report to the President and the Congress,” Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (15 August 2005), viii.

³⁰ The 5 brigades are generally aligned with the Continent’s primary sub-regional organizations: Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) in the East, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in the south, Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC) in the center, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the west. The sub-regional organization for North Africa is still undecided but that brigade may form around the Arab Magreb Union.

³¹ Marian Drake, Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Office of African Affairs, The African Standby Force: Regional Progress, 27 July 2005. The mission scenarios that are envisioned for ASF forces range from regional observer missions to peacekeeping to intervention / peace enforcement in situations (genocide) where the international community does not promptly respond.

³² In 2003, the AU also deployed forces to Burundi.

³³ EUCOM has an Air Force ltcol stationed in Abuja, Nigeria as a liaison officer to ECOWAS headquarters

³⁴ The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has 3 regional coordinators located in Africa, each resp for a portion of the Gulf of Guinea: Abidjan, Cote D’Ivoire, Accra, Ghana and Nairobi, Kenya (responsible for Angola). The IMO is the “UN agency responsible for improving maritime safety and preventing pollution from ships.” Among the responsibilities of the Regional Coordinators are for them to identify maritime needs and priorities in conjunction with relevant countries and to co-operate in capacity building programs, etc. EUCOM is hosting a maritime security conference in Accra, Ghana in March 2006, home of one of the IMO’s regional offices.

The Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa (MOWCA), established in May 1975 and headquartered in Cote D’Ivoire, is Africa’s only sub-regional body dedicated to providing a platform for handling all maritime matters common to its member states. MOWCA brings together the 25 countries on the West and Central African shipping range (including five landlocked countries). The objective is to serve the regional and international community as a one-stop shop for handling all maritime matters that are regional in character. The matters handled by MOWCA cover the cost-effectiveness of the supply and demand for shipping services in the sub-region as well as maritime safety and environmental protection issues. The over-riding role of MOWCA is to ensure for the sub region a cost effective shipping service high on safety and low on pollution.

³⁵ Fulford.

³⁶ Morrison and Goldwyn, 21.

³⁷ Carafano and Gardiner.

³⁸ See, for example, John E. Campbell, “Sub-Saharan Africa and the Unified Command Plan,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 2001-2002; or Richard G. Catoire, “A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan,” Parameters, Winter 2000-2001; or Carafano and Gardiner.

³⁹ The ambassadorial level position of U.S. Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Caspian Energy Issues was created in Aug 98.

⁴⁰ Morrison and Goldwyn, 17.

⁴¹ David Lamb, The Africans, (New York: Random House, 1982), xiii.

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